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Comment  Jocelyn E. Finlay
In their chapter, Mason, Lee, and Lee explore the macroeconomic implica-
tions of the decline in fertility and mortality over the past ﬁ  fty years with a 
particular focus on the Asian region.
During the demographic transition there is a decline in the mortality rate 
followed (often much later, as in the case of India) by the decline in the fer-
tility rate. In the early stages of the demographic transition when mortality 
rates fall but the fertility rate remains high, population growth is very strong. 
In India, during this window of time the population growth rate hiked from 
0.3 in 1900 to 2.2 around 1980.
The economic implications of the demographic transition have long been 
an avenue of enquiry. It was the work by Kelley and Schmidt (1995) which 
showed that population growth as a single variable did not have a signiﬁ  -
cant eﬀect on economic growth, but rather the components behind popula-
tion growth were considered empirically important and theoretically inter-
esting.
In addition to their eﬀect on population growth, changes in mortality and 
fertility rates also have an eﬀect on age structure of the population. With 
people living longer, the number of people in the older age groups increases. 
Couple this with the decline in fertility and the proportion of youth relative 
to the elderly declines.
One striking demographic feature that has come about during the demo-
graphic transition is the rise in the working-  age share. When the fertility 
rate declines, the number of youth-  age individuals declines relative to the 
number of working-  age individuals. The working-  age share increases. The 
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number of workers relative to the number of dependents increases (assum-
ing little or no change in the number of old-  age dependents), and income 
per capita increases through this accounting measure. Mason, Lee, and Lee 
deﬁ  ne this as the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend as explained in this chapter and 
by others (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003).
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, as the fertility rate 
fell in many countries the working-  age share increased. The eﬀects of the 
rapid decline in fertility dominated the eﬀects of the increase in life expec-
tancy so that the working-  age share increased. Lowering the number of 
births and lowering the number of deaths per thousand in the population 
have an equal eﬀect on population growth (the Rate of Natural Increase, 
NRI). However, births have a more dramatic eﬀect on age structure than 
deaths as the injection of births is concentrated at the ﬁ  rst age group, while 
deaths are spread over the entire age distribution. The working-  age share 
will increase with a decline in the fertility rate as the number of individuals 
entering the youth age-  group instantaneously declines.
Presently, many countries are entering a period where we observe a stabi-
lizing of the fertility rate decline. Thus the upward pressure on the working-
 age share from the declining youth- age end of the age spectrum will weaken, 
and the downward force on the working-  age share from an increasing pro-
portion of old-  age individuals will become stronger. With stabilizing fertil-
ity rates and an ever increasing life expectancy in many Asian countries the 
working-  age share is set to decline.
Approaching the issues of population change from the age- structure per-
spective, Mason, Lee, and Lee then explore the economic implications of the 
demographic transition. The authors look at past trends in the relationship 
between age structure and economic growth, but consider the role of the 
second demographic dividend in oﬀsetting the negative eﬀects of the decline 
in the working-  age share. The second demographic dividend comes about 
as the rise in life expectancy encourages greater savings. With higher savings 
and lower population growth, the capital-  output ratio deﬁ  ned through the 
Solow-  Swan model increases.
Population numbers in the future are not all based on predictions; cohorts 
alive today will survive into future age groups probabilistically and make up 
the population stock in the future. The combination of certainty over the 
current stock and observed prior serial correlation in fertility and mortality 
trends means that we can predict the future population level with a degree 
of conﬁ  dence. An epidemic that unexpectedly kills a large number of people 
or an unexpected rebound of the fertility rate to 1960 rates could, of course, 
make the predictions over population growth and levels inaccurate.
What is less predictable in the course of the demographic transition is the 
behavioral change that comes with the shift in the age structure of the popu-
lation. In the second half of the twentieth century, the rise in the working-
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working-  age share brought with it a rise in female labor force participation 
(Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay 2007) and an increase in human capi-
tal accumulation (Galor and Weil 1996)—factors that are predominantly 
backed by the decline in the fertility rate.
The reason for caution regarding predications over behavioral change into 
the future is that the decline in the working-  age share in the years to come 
will be backed by the rise in life expectancy and an increasing proportion of 
elderly dependents. Trends in the past that came with the decline in fertil-
ity may not translate to the scenario of an increase in life expectancy. Thus 
behavioral patterns we observed with the increase in the working-  age share 
in the past may not be reversed as the working-  age share is set to decline in 
the future.
The two behavioral responses to the demographic transition Mason, Lee, 
and Lee focus on are the change human capital accumulation and physical 
capital accumulation, with particular attention on the latter. Changes in 
the savings rate are subject to unknown behavioral responses. Population 
growth rate decline is understood with a degree of conﬁ  dence. Thus predic-
tions over future capital-  output ratios depend on predictions over savings 
behavior change.
Mason, Lee, and Lee, too, are careful with these assumptions over pre-
dicted behavioral change and draw on our understanding of behavioral 
responses in an aging society. In particular for this article they draw on the 
savings rate implications. Asia is a particularly interesting example in terms 
of savings and capital ﬂ  ows across time and generations. For while many 
Asian countries do not have a formal Pay-  As-  You-  Go system (PAYGO), 
they have a strong culture of intergenerational transfers which are in eﬀect 
very similar to the pay-  as-  you-  go system. Asian countries have also been 
typically known as high saving countries, but these rates are declining.
In a simulation exercise, Mason, Lee, and Lee plot out projections through 
2050 over net savings rate, asset/ labor income ratios, and consumption index 
under two scenarios: a high savings/  low intergenerational transfers; and, a 
low savings/  high intergenerational transfers. The assumption is that those 
in old-  age will fund the gap between income and expenditure with either 
savings or intergenerational transfers. The authors show that, relatively, 
Thailand in 2004 was of the high savings/  low transfer category, and Japan 
in 2004 was a low savings/  high transfer country. Thus within Asia, either 
scenario is possible.
Some of the simulation results are not surprising: a high savings envi-
ronment will lead to stronger net savings and stronger asset/  labor income. 
Interestingly, the low intergenerational transfer scenario will lead to higher 
consumption in the future. It is not clear why high savings will lead to higher 
consumption than high intergenerational transfers. Assumptions over the 
interest earned on savings will certainly aﬀect this result.
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intergenerational transfers may be more eﬀective. The authors do caution 
the reader with regard to existing trends indicating that many Asian coun-
tries comply more strongly to the high transfers/ low savings scenario (Japan, 
Korea, Rep., Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Vietnam each have a Pay-
  As-  You-  Go social security system). However, there are many Asian coun-
tries that have low intergenerational transfers and also within the formal 
social security setting adopt the fully funded pension scheme (Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have fully funded social security 
schemes) (Bloom, Canning, Mansﬁ  eld, and Moore 2007) thus comply with 
the low transfers/  high savings scenario.
Throughout the Asian region the demographic transition will lead to an 
increasing proportion of the population aged over sixty years—the aging 
of the population. In many Asian countries, signiﬁ  cant aging will not begin 
to occur until after 2025, and many individuals due to retire in 2025 are cur-
rently in the workforce. Current savings patterns and transfer policies will 
aﬀect aging societies in the future.
This chapter by Mason, Lee, and Lee provides a cautionary note. Pay- As-
 You- Go social security systems and the promotion of familial transfers may 
lead to lower welfare outcomes than fully funded systems, and private sav-
ings to fund retirement years. But in these discussions the uncertainty lies in 
the behavioral changes and future policy changes that will come as a society 
ages. Labor force participation behavior of men and women of various ages, 
savings patterns at the various ages, education choices and its returns are 
just some fundamental factors that remain unknown. Pronatalist policies, 
mandated age of retirement increasing, and immigration policies could also 
shift the age structure, the working-  age share, and its implications dramati-
cally. We observed behavioral changes and policy shifts as the fertility rate 
declined over the past ﬁ  fty years, but as societies become aging societies over 
the next ﬁ  fty years, what behavioral and policy changes will this bring and 
what will be the implications of these changes? A contribution of the Mason, 
Lee, and Lee chapter is that it brings knowledge to this question.
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Comment  Jong- Wha  Lee
The Mason, Lee, and Lee chapter summarizes the main features of demo-
graphic transition in Asia since 1960—characterized by fertility decline, 
population aging, and decrease in working-  age population. The chapter 
highlights three important channels by which demographic transition inﬂ  u-
ences economic growth in Asia. They include (a) the change in working- age 
population (ﬁ  rst demographic dividend), (b) the change in savings rate and 
capital accumulation (second demographic dividend), and (c) human capital 
investment.
This chapter addresses an important issue: fertility decline and popula-
tion aging are becoming increasingly important in the region, especially in 
Northeast Asia. This chapter addresses the economic and social implications 
of demographic transition and discusses the role of an intergenerational 
transfer system for supporting the growing number of elderly population. 
While I agree on most of the chapter’s ﬁ  ndings, I have a few questions.
The ﬁ  rst concerns the second demographic dividend in Asia. The estima-
tion of the ﬁ  rst dividend is straightforward. The estimates show that the 
ﬁ  rst dividend has become negative in several Asian economies with rapidly 
expanding elderly populations. The critical question concerns the size of 
the second dividend, which is important for the aggregate growth eﬀect of 
demographic dividends. The chapter claims that longer life leads to higher 
savings, which raises the capital-  labor ratio and thus labor productivity. 
Hence, if the second dividend is large, an aging population could lead to 
higher—not lower—per capita income. However, it is not clear how strong 
leaving bequest or any other motives are to support increased elderly sav-
ings. Uncertainty surrounding the timing of retirement and death may have 
a strong inﬂ  uence on the pace of dissaving among the elderly and retirees. 
But it is not clear to what extent a motive of building inheritance can dampen 
the decline in savings during retirement. The chapter needs to discuss more 
empirical evidence of elderly savings in Asia.
Second, the chapter emphasizes the role of intergenerational transfers 
from the young to the old on net savings and ﬁ  nancial asset accumulation. 
The impact of demographic change on capital accumulation and economic 
growth hinges on the extent to which the population accumulates pension-
  transfer wealth versus physical capital accumulation over the lifetime. 
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